Jul 18, 2020 (thediplomat.com) - One of the key questions in Japan’s present national security debate is how to manage China’s “predatory†geoeconomics.
Where does Tokyo stand in crafting an effective economic security strategy?
Beijing has systematically integrated economic and financial instruments into its foreign policy with the objective of advancing its grand strategic ambitions. From the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to Made in China 2025, Beijing shrewdly incorporated geoeconomic tools of statecraft into its grand strategic thinking. China’s coercive economic maneuvering employs trade, investments, technology, internationalizing of currency and even weaponization of resource supply chains toward geopolitical ends.
Thus, reorienting Japan’s economic security strategy constitutes a top priority for Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. The objective is primarily to secure cutting edge technologies including next-generation 5G networks; strengthening foreign investment regulations in “core industries†in 12 strategic sectors; blocking COVID-19 bargain hunters grabbing key businesses; protecting intellectual property and averting forced technology transfers; fortifying self-sufficiency in strategic metals and mineral resource supply; managing China’s plans for a digital yuan; and better strategizing developmental aid in the Indo-Pacific. From instituting an economic unit at the National Security Secretariat (NSS), conceiving a U.S.-Japan economic security dialogue, and joining forces with other democracies in a D-10 (the G7 plus India, Australia and South Korea) framework for 5G and the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence — Japan’s strategic thinking on economic security is manifesting.
Pre-pandemic, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s priority was how to secure Japan’s economic interests amid worrying trends of de-globalization, receding trade liberalization, and increasing protectionism. Japan, as the world’s third largest economy, has led in building the multilateral trading system, particularly with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11) following the U.S. exit from the Trans-Pacific Partnership; the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU following Brexit; and steering the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) process. At the Osaka G-20, Japan pushed for building rules for data governance and constructing a new regime underpinned by “data free flow with trust†(DFFT).
