TOKYO - Reports that a man posing as an employee of Russian airline Aeroflot conducted intelligence operations in Tokyo have renewed attention on Russian espionage in Japan, a country former Soviet intelligence officers have described as unusually easy for spies to operate in because of weaknesses in its legal and counterintelligence framework.
Sanshiro Hosaka, a researcher at the International Centre for Defence and Security in Estonia and a specialist in Russian intelligence agencies, said Russian espionage against Japan has existed since the Soviet era and should come as little surprise.
The recent case involves a man who reportedly operated in Tokyo under the cover of employment with Aeroflot while gathering Japanese technology and equipment that could potentially be diverted to military uses in Russia's war against Ukraine.
Hosaka said Japanese general-purpose products have already been found reaching Russia through third countries and being used in connection with the war, making tighter controls an important issue for Japan.
Former Soviet intelligence officers have described Japan as a "spy paradise," saying there are few countries where intelligence personnel can operate as easily.
Hosaka attributed that reputation partly to Japan's postwar development of its security institutions. While Japan maintained its pacifist orientation and established the Self-Defense Forces, intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities developed more slowly.
One longstanding weakness, he said, has been the absence of a comprehensive legal foundation specifically designed to counter espionage.
Russian intelligence officers assigned to Japan are briefed before deployment about the country's laws and enforcement environment, Hosaka said. Foreign intelligence services therefore have a detailed understanding of what activities can be conducted in Japan and where the limits of Japanese authorities lie.
Russia's modern intelligence structure emerged from the breakup of the Soviet KGB. Two of its principal successors are the Federal Security Service, known as the FSB, and the Foreign Intelligence Service, or SVR.
The FSB is primarily responsible for domestic security and counterintelligence, but it also conducts operations abroad. The SVR specializes in foreign intelligence.
Russia also operates the GRU, the military intelligence organization under the country's armed forces. Hosaka said the person who used the Aeroflot cover in Japan was identified as a GRU intelligence officer.
Although Russia's intelligence agencies compete with one another, they are also capable of cooperation. Hosaka said President Vladimir Putin can effectively assign a particular issue to one organization or official, after which intelligence resources can be assembled across institutional boundaries.
Powerful figures close to Putin can also exert influence within parts of the intelligence establishment. Hosaka cited Igor Sechin, head of state-controlled oil company Rosneft, as an example of an oligarch with connections to elements inside the FSB.
Russian intelligence personnel operating overseas use several kinds of cover.
The most traditional method is diplomatic cover. Intelligence officers may work under official titles at Russian embassies or trade missions, allowing them to benefit from diplomatic protections.
Because host-country counterintelligence agencies often know or suspect which diplomats are intelligence officers, however, their movements may be monitored.
That creates an incentive to recruit citizens of the target country who can collect information or establish contacts without attracting the same scrutiny.
At the other end of the spectrum are so-called "illegals," intelligence personnel who eliminate almost every visible connection to Russia and assume identities from third countries.
Such operatives may obtain passports and other documentation presenting them as citizens of countries such as Brazil or Argentina before traveling to targets including the United States or European nations.
Arriving as apparent Latin American citizens makes them far more difficult for local authorities to identify immediately as Russian intelligence personnel. They can then live in the target country for extended periods while conducting clandestine operations.
Hosaka said Russia also uses operatives who fall somewhere between diplomats and full illegals. These people do not conceal that they are Russian and may use their real names, but enter foreign countries under occupations such as students or journalists while effectively conducting intelligence work.
The balance among diplomatic-cover officers, illegals and other operatives depends on the counterintelligence capabilities of the target country and the state of its diplomatic relations with Russia.
That balance shifted sharply after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Hosaka said about 700 Russian diplomats were expelled from Europe and North America following the invasion, many of whom were believed to have been conducting intelligence activities under diplomatic cover. Japan also expelled several Russian diplomats.
With fewer officers able to operate under diplomatic status, Russia increasingly needed alternative methods to continue intelligence work in those countries.
One method is to activate illegals who may have spent years living quietly as so-called sleeper agents. Such operatives can become particularly important when diplomatic relations deteriorate, diplomats are expelled or relations move toward wartime or near-wartime conditions.
Hosaka said Europe is now effectively in such a confrontational environment with Russia, increasing the potential value of operatives traveling under identities from third countries.
Detecting an illegal can be extremely difficult because the person's identity may be built around genuine records rather than an entirely fictional individual.
The technique dates back to the Cold War. Russian intelligence services have examined records of children who died young in another country and used those identities as the foundation for an operative's fabricated life history.
Such identity-building techniques allow intelligence personnel to establish backgrounds that can withstand ordinary scrutiny, making the true Russian connection difficult to uncover without extensive counterintelligence investigation.
Source: テレ東BIZ
