TOKYO - Amid rising rice prices, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Shinjiro Koizumi has stirred debate by floating the idea of emergency rice imports. This is not his first confrontation with Japan’s powerful agricultural cooperatives. Nearly a decade ago, Koizumi attempted major reforms of JA (Japan Agricultural Cooperatives), only to face fierce resistance from entrenched interests within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
As tensions again rise between market stabilization and agricultural protectionism, a deeper look reveals a complex web of political compromise, economic strategy, and personal history.
Koizumi has recently declared that “anything necessary” will be done to curb the surging rice prices, even hinting at expanded imports. This position was in direct contrast to LDP Secretary-General Moriyama, who stated that “Japan must not rely on foreign rice” and that maintaining domestic agricultural self-sufficiency is critical.
Despite these seemingly opposing views, behind the scenes, Koizumi and Moriyama are reportedly in close communication. Some insiders suggest their public disagreements may be more about optics than actual division. Political journalist Kenji Goto noted that Koizumi’s statements are likely strategic pressure aimed at the rice market—to deter price hikes and encourage retailers to release stockpiled rice at lower prices. In this scenario, the threat of imports is less about policy implementation and more about influencing market psychology.
The relationship between Koizumi and Moriyama is deeply rooted in past reform efforts. Back in 2015, Koizumi, then head of the LDP’s agriculture division, attempted to overhaul JA by pushing for lower prices on farming supplies and greater transparency in their procurement process. He highlighted inefficiencies like near-identical cardboard boxes sold at different prices, criticizing JA’s monopolistic practices. At the time, Moriyama, a senior figure in the agriculture lobby, was agriculture minister. Seated at the table with Koizumi and JA leadership was veteran politician Arata Nishikawa—then dubbed the “don” of the agriculture lobby.
While initially cooperative, JA’s stance hardened after a government advisory panel proposed downsizing JA’s supply divisions, sparking fears of losing autonomy. Resistance spread through the LDP’s “agriculture tribe” of lawmakers, many of whom rely on JA for electoral support. Eventually, Koizumi’s reforms were watered down; deadlines were removed, and JA retained its internal control over pricing.
Even today, JA’s influence remains formidable. With around 10 million members, it provides crucial election support to LDP lawmakers, not only mobilizing voters but also supplying campaign manpower. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries also maintains close ties to JA, using it to implement large-scale budgets—many of which go to infrastructure projects that have been criticized as wasteful.
This tight triangle—JA, the agriculture ministry, and LDP agriculture lawmakers—continues to resist reform. Yet its strength is eroding. The number of “agriculture tribe” lawmakers has declined, and electoral changes have reduced the political power of rural constituencies. While JA still holds sway in key regions like Kagoshima and Hokkaido, its capacity to determine national outcomes is weakening.
Amid these shifts, Koizumi’s recent moves can be seen as both a revival of past reform attempts and a tactical maneuver ahead of the upper house election. By tackling rice prices, he offers the ruling party a populist platform—relief from food inflation—without needing to cut taxes. However, whether the LDP will pursue deep agricultural reform after the election remains uncertain.
Experts warn that real reform must include addressing structural issues. Japan’s rice production is increasingly concentrated among small-scale farmers, many of whom rely on JA not only for sales but for logistical and financial support. Direct-to-market models are viable only for a minority of large producers. Thus, any reform that weakens JA without replacing its core functions risks destabilizing rural agriculture.
Furthermore, financial pressure on Japan’s agricultural cooperatives is a geopolitical issue. JA’s banking arm, Norinchukin Bank, controls over 100 trillion yen in assets, much of it invested globally. Critics argue that this money is not being reinvested in Japanese agriculture, while some foreign governments—most notably the U.S.—see Norinchukin’s influence as a non-tariff barrier to financial sector access.
There are foreign models to study. In the Netherlands, Rabobank—originally a cooperative—successfully balances financial power with support for agricultural lending. In contrast, Japan’s cooperative financial system remains fragmented and politically entangled, hampering effective risk-taking and capital deployment.
In sum, Japan’s rice crisis is not merely about supply and demand—it is a window into the nation’s unresolved tension between tradition and reform. Koizumi’s challenge to JA is not new, but whether it gains traction this time depends on whether political will can overcome deeply embedded interests. As one commentator noted, the forces that once held the system together may now be causing its slow unraveling.
Source: TBS
