Is Japan’s Lifetime Employment Model Creating “Do-Nothing Middle-Aged Workers”

The discussion comes as diplomatic tensions between Japan and China continue to escalate following remarks by Prime Minister Koichi on a potential Taiwan contingency. China has reacted sharply, summoning Japan’s ambassador, warning students against studying in Japan, and urging citizens to reconsider travel. In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dispatched Asia and Oceania Bureau Director-General Kanai to Beijing on November — seeking to stabilize relations and reiterate that Koichi’s comments did not represent a shift in Japan’s core policy. The government maintains that it will monitor the situation carefully and respond appropriately.

Commentators note that diplomatic friction has already had practical impacts. A long-running private forum between Tokyo and Beijing, organized by the think tank Genron NPO since 2005, was forced to postpone its scheduled session. Analysts argue that such disruptions run counter to Japan’s broader national interest, which includes safeguarding the work, study, and cultural exchange opportunities of its citizens. Political commentator Shinsuke Shosei emphasized during the program that both sides must avoid further escalation, noting that diplomatic expulsions—such as designating a diplomat persona non grata—could push relations toward a dangerous rupture similar to past crises.

Meanwhile, domestic attention has shifted to Koichi’s directive to consider easing labor-hour regulations. As companies face severe labor shortages yet also struggle with excess personnel in certain age groups, observers warn that structural contradictions in Japan’s employment system are becoming more pronounced. In a 2015 estimate often cited in the debate, more than 4 million workers were expected to be classified as surplus talent by 2025, highlighting deep imbalances.

The program’s discussion centered on the idea of “do-nothing middle-aged workers,” a term popularized by Showa Women’s University visiting professor Shirakawa Tomoko, who argues that these individuals are not merely lazy but are casualties of Japan’s lifetime employment system. Panelists included former Nissan COO and startup advisor Shiga Toshiyuki and Mainichi Shimbun senior editorial staff member Sato Chiko.

Interviews with office workers reflect mixed sentiments. Younger employees say they frequently encounter older colleagues who stretch simple tasks over long hours, spend excessive time chatting, or disappear for extended breaks. Some admit frustration that individuals contributing less continue to receive stable salaries under the seniority-based model. Older workers, on the other hand, express doubts about whether decades of loyalty were rewarded fairly, particularly as starting salaries for new graduates have risen and career paths have shifted under recent reforms.

A structural analysis presented on the program highlighted that Japan’s mass hiring of new graduates creates a pyramid in which many workers enter at the same time but very few ultimately advance into management. Because job roles are not clearly defined under the membership-based system, companies rotate employees through multiple departments for years in the hope of developing versatile generalists. However, Shirakawa noted that it takes on average 22 years—until around age 44—for employees to fully realize whether they have a future in management, often leaving them little time to develop specialized skills or chart alternative career paths. By the time they are told they lack potential for advancement, many have family and financial responsibilities that make mid-career moves difficult.

Shiga added that while companies historically managed surplus personnel by transferring them to subsidiaries or partner firms, consolidation and restructuring have sharply reduced these options. As a result, large corporations now retain workers who may no longer have suitable roles, a situation that younger, more mobile talent increasingly finds demotivating. He warned that this dynamic risks weakening corporate competitiveness if ambitious employees choose to leave rather than advance within rigid hierarchies.

Case studies illustrate the challenges. A small manufacturing company in Kawasaki previously relied on long hours and senior craftsmen who monopolized key tasks, often working excessive overtime while overall productivity stagnated. When the firm attempted reforms—including sharp reductions in overtime, investment in childcare leave programs, and proactive hiring of women—results improved dramatically. Productivity rose, female employees tripled, and the company received a municipal award for workplace innovation. However, many older male employees reacted strongly against the changes, with 10 out of 25 veteran staff ultimately leaving. Management says those who remained have since adapted and improved.

Shirakawa stresses that her definition of “do-nothing middle-aged workers” goes beyond age or gender, referring instead to those who resist necessary change and cling to outdated norms. She argues that as the pandemic accelerated new work styles, resistance from such employees became a major impediment to corporate transformation.

The panel concluded that Japan’s longstanding employment model—successful during the era of rapid growth—now faces structural limits. Without clearer job definitions, earlier career assessments, and reskilling opportunities, the cycle producing disengaged mid-career employees will continue. At the same time, companies must find ways to reinvigorate this group, many of whom were once enthusiastic workers but became misaligned with organizational demands. With labor shortages intensifying, how Japan addresses the motivations and roles of its middle-aged workforce may prove critical to sustaining economic growth in the years ahead.

Source: TBS